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TRUSTS-SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS-REDUCTION IN INCOME AS JUSTIFICATION
FOR TERMINATION IN FAVOR OF BENEFICIARY-Testatrix died in 1913 leaving a will which established a $20,000 spendthrift trust. The income from
this trust was to be paid to her son for life with the remainder, in default
of issue and the exercise of a general testamentary power of appointment,
to go to the other descendants of the testatrix then living.1 The stated
purpose of the trust was to assure her son of "a support throughout his

1 The son claimed that a life estate coupled with a general power of appointment
constituted an estate tantamount to a fee. In discounting this issue, the court commented that a life estate under a spendthrift trust will not coalesce or merge with an
estate in remainder. Principal case at 336. See also Wormser Estate, 85 D. & C. 526 (1953).
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. . . whole life, under any circumstances.''2 The son, 65 years old and
without issue, sought to terminate the trust on the ground that he was
about to be retired with little probability of obtaining further employment
and faced the prospect of being unable to support himself and his wife.
The income of the trust had fallen substantially and at the time amounted
to only $660 a year.8 The lower court allowed a partial invasion of the
corpus. On appeal, held, reversed. After the death of the settlor a partial
reduction of income is insufficient to constitute such a failure of purpose
of a spendthrift trust as to warrant its termination or modification, when
such a decree would benefit the life tenant. In re Bosler's Estate, 378
Pa. 333, 107 A. (2d) 443 (1954).
Even though all the beneficiaries of a spendthrift trust request its
termination,4 an equity court will not grant termination if the settlor is
deceased5 and the purposes of the trust have not been fully accomplished. 6
Since the purpose of a spendthrift provision is to prevent the voluntary
or involuntary alienation of the beneficiary's interest,7 when a court terminates the trust and turns complete control over to the beneficiary, it
obviously defeats that purpose. If, however, because of circumstances not
known to the settlor and not anticipated by him, the continuation of
the trust would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of its
purpose, the court will direct or permit the termination or modification
of the trust. 8 Although for the past fifteen years Pennsylvania lower courts
have held that a considerable reduction in trust income may constitute
a failure of purpose of a spendthrift trust and have allowed either a
partial or complete termination under these circumstances,9 no appellate
court has granted a termination for this reason. 10 Where a support or
annuity trust is involved, however, there is authority to the effect that a
reduction of income may constitute a frustration of purpose, and that an
invasion of the corpus may be allowed in such circumstances even without
2 Principal case at 335.
a Ibid.
4 If all the beneficiaries do not consent, or there are unascertained contingent remaindermen who cannot consent, the trust will not be terminated. Kamerly Estate, 348 Pa.
225, 35 A. (2d) 258 (1944).
5 If the settlor is living and both he and the beneficiaries consent, the trust may be
terminated even though its purposes have not been accomplished. Bowers' Trust Estate,
346 Pa. 85, 29 A. (2d) 519 (1943); 2 TRUSIS RFsrATEMENT §338, comment h, §339 (1935).
6 GRISWOLD, SPENDTIIRIFr TRUSIS, 2d ed. §517 (1947); 2 TRUSIS RFsrATEMENT §337,
comment l, §338, comment a (1935).
7 1 Scorr, TRUSTS §153.3 (1939).
8 2 TRUSTS RFsrATEMENT §336 (1935); 1 TRUSTS RFsrATEMENT §167 (1935).
9 Auchu's Estate, 38 Pa. D. & C. 33 (1939); Honeywell Estate, 70 Pa. D. & C. 472 (1950);
Kelby Estate, 80 Pa. D. & C. 1 (1952).
10 Vines v. Vines, 143 Tenn. 517, 226 S.W. 1039 (1920); Brumbaugh v. Adcock, 235
Mo. App. 643, 144 S.W. (2d) 823 (1940); Brandt v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., (N. Y.
Sup.Ct. 1943) 43 N.Y.S. (2d) 255. For current statements that a rise in the cost of living
and a reduction of income do not constitute a failure of purpose, see Maley v. Citizens
National Bank of Evansville, 120 Ind. App. 642, 92 N.E. (2d) 727 (1950); Wogman v. Wells
Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 123 Cal. App. (2d) 657, 267 P. (2d) 423 (1954).
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the consent of the remaindermen.11 In these cases the courts infer that
the support of the life beneficiary is the primary purpose of the trust,
and that partial termination, therefore, furthers the settlor's intent. This
inference has not been carried forward to the case of a spendthrift trust, in
which there is a specific provision operating to prevent the beneficiary
from reaching his interest. In this situation the courts have not allowed
the general aim to provide support to override the explicit prohibition
against alienation. 12 The trust involved in the principal case contained
a specifically expressed purpose to support the son under any circumstances. Since this conflicted with the spendthrift provision, the court
held that the latter should control on the assumption that the testatrix
must have realized there would be a change in circumstances and therefore would have provided for advances if she had intended the support
provision to predominate.13 This conclusion is questionable. It is at
least reasonably doubtful whether a person in 1916 could have foreseen
the extent of change in the current economy. Nevertheless, the decision
is in accord with Pennsylvania common law which denies termination
in any case where contingent remaindermen are involved, regardless of a
failure of purpose. 14 Under the provisions of the Pennsylvania Estates
Act of 1947,w which liberalized the requirements for terminations of
spendthrift trusts, this trust probably would have been modified. Although
this act cannot affect previously established trusts, there is nothing to
prevent the courts from adopting the statutory policy and exercising it
under their own equitable powers.16 Rather than giving effect to the
spendthrift provision, irrespective of the welfare or interest of the beneficiary,17 the court would have done better to grant the relief in accordance with the policy of the Estates Act and the trust's express purpose
of support. As it stands, the principal case represents another example
of the unfortunate results often produced by the much-criticized dead
hand.18
Norman A. Zilber, S. Ed.
•l,l Nirdlinger's Estate, 331 Pa. 135, 200 A. 656 (1938); In re Wolcott, 95 N.H. 23, 56
A. (2d) 641 (1948), noted in 47 Mica. L. REv. 422 (1949); Bolles v. Boatmen's National
Banlc of St. Louis, 363 Mo. 949, 255 S.W. (2d) 725 (1953). See Segelken v. Segelken, 26 N.J.
Super. 178, 97 A. (2d) 501 (1953).
12 In matters of administration, however, the courts do modify trusts contrary to the
specific intent of the settlor. 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEF.S, rev. ed., §561 (1951); Brunswick, "The Court Moves The Dead Hand," 15 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 24 (1936).
13 Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. J. R. Shanley Estate Co., 113 N.J. Eq. 562, 167 A.
865 (1933); Rogers v. English, 130 Conn. 332, 33 A. (2d) 540 (1943).
14 See notes 1 and 2 supra; 24 TEMPLE L. Q. 84 (1950).
15 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §301.2. The act provides that spendthrift
trusts can be terminated without the consent of the remaindermen if there is a failure
of purpose. See Lefever, "Termination of Trusts in Pennsylvania," 96 UNIV. PA. L.
REv. 305 (1948).
16 See Kelby Estate, note 7 supra.
11 See Borsch Estate, 362 Pa. 581, 67 A. (2d) 119 (1949).
18 GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§391-393 (1947); 63 HARv. L. REv. 714
(1950).

